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Abstract: The aim of the risk decision theory is to describe the behavior of agents in 
the face of several random prospects. Since it is difficult to describe these preferences, 
we seek to represent them. The use of a representative function of preferences has been 
for a long time, the usual method of describing behavior in a random context. The 
obvious advantage of this method is that it allows including these data in a formalized 
model and, by extension, to understand the optimization process underlying any 
decision. 
The determination of the representative function of preferences must be based on an 
axiomatic basis. From these axioms, an accurate specification of the value function will 
be derived. The purpose of this article is to examine the history of theories that have 
sought to determine a satisfactory criterion for responding to the risk decision problem 
and to analyze the contribution of these models. 
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Introduction 
By exposing the famous problem known as the "Petersburg paradox", Daniel Bernoulli 
(1738) showed that the behavior of an economic agent averse to risk is characterized by 
a certain equivalent. This paradox examined by Nicolas Bernoulli (1713) challenged the 
validity of expected value. 
The attitude towards the risk of the economic agent determines its utility function. For 
this reason, D. Bernoulli (1738) proposed replacing the criterion of expected value with 
that of expected utility. The proposed function was u x
x
( ) log 







1   avec 0,  .  
The mathematician Gabriel Cramer (1728), a contemporary of Bernoulli, arrived at a 
solution close to that worked out by the latter using another utility function of wealth: 
u(x) = x  which postulates, like the preceding one, a decrease in the marginal utility of 
wealth. Later, in 1947, with the work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM), that a 
theory of utility was defined. The progress of the article is as follows. Section 1 
presents a synthesis of the theory of expected utility. In the second section, we present 
the risk decision models. The notion of risk aversion will be developed in Section 3. 
Finally, we conclude with the criticisms addressed to these models. 
1. Theory of expected utility 
The expected utility theorem states that, when confronted with a set of action lines with 
random results or, more generally, with a lottery set, an individual will choose the one 
whose expected utility is the highest, As far as its behavior respects five axioms: 
comparability, transitivity, strong independence, continuity and dominance. 
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This theory has two main qualities: 
- First, it separates beliefs about sources of uncertainty, represented by probabilities on 
uncertain events and utility for payoff, represented by a utility function on the 
consequences. 
- Second, the function representing the preferences is linear in probabilities. 
These qualities are at the origin of the success of the expected utility model as a means 
of representing the preferences of agents operating in an uncertain environment. 
However, two questions arise:  
- First, is it reasonable to assume that every agent is able to attribute a single probability 
distribution to any situation of uncertainty?  
- Second, even when there is a probability distribution, does the agent behave according 
to the expected utility model? 
The authors who have examined the model of expected utility have shown that the 
utility levels attached to the different earnings merely reflect an order of preference and 
should not be given any psychological or philosophical interpretation. Thus, the 
construction of the utility curve depends only on the initial payoff of the decision maker 
and his aversion towards risk. It should be emphasized that if the criterion of 
maximization of expected utility provides a theoretical answer to the problem of choice 
in an uncertainty situation, it will not make possible to choose the best investment, only 
if the characteristics of the utility function of the decision maker are perfectly 
identified. Indeed, if the attitude of the decision maker respects the axioms of VNM, the 
first derivative of the utility function will be positive and, according to Friedman and 
Savage (1948), the second derivative will be negative for a risk averse decision maker.  
Other authors such as Vickrey (1945), Kaysen (1946), and Friedman & Savage (1948) 
wondered how the utility model could account for the behavior of all those who 
subscribed to insurance and purchased lottery tickets. Indeed, paying an insurance 
premium amounts to preferring a small loss with certainty rather than a large loss with 
low probability. 
The first attitude seems, in their view, to attest the hypothesis of decline of marginal 
utility, while the latter seems to contradict it. Friedman & Savage (1948) provide the 
following answer: the utility function is first concave, then convex, and again concave, 
thus allowing attitudes previously considered contradictory.  
This discussion will be eclipsed by the advent of the concept of independence. The idea 
is that "the order of preferences between two lotteries will not be changed if the two 
lotteries are combined with the same third lottery". This idea is the keystone of the 
expected utility model, and it is the axiom of independence that makes the utility 
function linear in probability. Although it was widely accepted later, it was nevertheless 
strongly questioned by Maurice Allais (1953), from its emergence. He demonstrates 
how difficult the axiom of independence to resist simple experiments. These 
experiments will for a long time be called "paradoxes", insofar as the observed violation 
of the axiom of independence was interpreted as an anomaly. Under the name of "Allais 
paradox", one implies an experiment leading to this violation. Hence, expected utility 
does not seem to represent the preferences of a majority of agents, but it must be 
consistent with the behavior of the agent and reflect his attitude towards risk. 
 
1.1. Risk aversion measures 
Risk aversion is a central assumption in modern financial theory. Indeed, investors 
demand a higher remuneration as the risk of their financial locations is high. 
Studies show that an investor has risk aversion if his utility function u is strictly 
concave. In other words, the marginal utility of wealth must be decreasing ( 0(.)" u ). If 
 3 
the marginal utility of wealth is increasing (resp. constant), the investor opts for the risk 
(resp. risk neutral). 
Arrow (1965) and Friend & Blume (1975) have shown that absolute risk aversion 
decreases when an agent's payoff increases. As for Pratt (1964), he showed that relative 
aversion grows with payoff as a consequence of the fact that absolute aversion to risk is 
decreasing in payoff. This hypothesis has been questioned by Friend & Blume (1975) 
who have shown that the relative aversion is rather constant. 
In the same context of uncertainty, Kimball (1990) introduces the notion of prudence as 
"the propensity of agents to arm themselves and prepare themselves for uncertainty". 
For him, prudence reflects how uncertainty affects decision variables. It analyzes 
problems in which the effect of risk is concerned with the marginal utility of agents and 
not with their total utility. Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) studied the saving 
decision in uncertainty. The results show that prudence indicates the intensity of the 
precautionary savings pattern. If future incomes are unpredictable, prudent agents save 
more to guard against changes in their future consumption. They conclude that this type 
of behavior is induced by the marginal convexity, i.e. it corresponds to a positive third 
derivative for the utility function VNM ( u"' (.) 0 ). However, the convexity of the 
marginal utility is implied by the decline in the absolute risk aversion of Arrow (1965) 
and Pratt (1964). This property implies that absolute prudence is greater than absolute 
risk aversion. The analogy between Arrow's and Pratt's and Kimball's is fairly obvious. 
The first evaluates the concavity of the utility function, the second evaluates the 
convexity of the marginal utility. In order to clarify the difference in nature between the 
two concepts, Viala and Briys (1995) cite the case of the quadratic utility function 
which is representative of risk aversion behavior but not of prudent behavior. The 
marginal utility is linear in wealth ( u"' (.)0 ). Consequently, if the agents associated 
with this utility function buy insurance, uncertainty never leads them to increase their 
savings in order to protect themselves against the hazards related to their future 
consumption. Indeed, if we consider the following quadratic utility function: U(r) = a + 
br - cr2 where r is the rate of return perceived by the investor and a, b and c are 
constants with b and c strictly positive. If such a function can describe the attitude of an 
investor who is risk averse, since his second derivative is negative, it can only be used 
if r 






c
b
2
,  for the first derivative to be positive. This limitation constitutes a 
disadvantage of the use of a quadratic utility function. 
1.2. Criticals addressed to the expected utility model 
In addition to the experimental violations of the axiom of independence, the expected 
utility model also raises a theoretical difficulty, namely the interpretation of the 
function u. Indeed, this function has two roles: 
- The first is to express the decision maker's attitude towards risk (the concavity of u 
involving risk aversion). 
- The second role consists in expressing the satisfaction of the results in the certain (the 
concavity of u implying a decreasing marginal utility of the payoff). 
In particular, it is impossible in this model, as noted by Cohen and Tallon (2000), to 
represent an agent that would have both a decreasing marginal utility and a taste for 
risk. If the model of utility expectation has the merit of parsimony, it does not allow 
separating the representation of the attitude with regard to the risk of that with respect 
to the guaranteed payoff. 
2. Risk decision models or "unexpected" utility theories 
The theory of expected utility remains the reference of the representation of behavior in 
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the face of an exogenous uncertainty. It applies to the case of an uncertainty measured 
by a probability distribution. As soon as the distribution is not known and may depend 
on the investor's decision to better take account for the type of uncertainty prevailing on 
financial markets, the expected utility model becomes incapable of adequately 
representing the " The investor's attitude to risk. On the other hand, the results of 
several empirical and experimental studies challenge the predictions of the standard 
theory of VNM (1947). For example, one of the first experimental studies, that of Allais 
(1953), calls into question the hypothesis of linearity in probabilities. Ellsberg (1961) 
also shows that agents do not respect the axiom of independence, noting that utility 
weights are not probabilities. Hence, the emergence of new decision models that take 
account of this failure. 
2.1. The Prospect Theory  
The idea of prospect theory is to represent preferences by a function V: L   Such as 
for a lottery 
L x p V L p u xi i i n i
i
n
i 

( , ) , ( ) ( ). ( ),........,1
1
                                                          [1]                   
where   is an increasing function of [0, 1] into [0, 1], with  (0) = 0 and  (1) = 1. 
 (.) translates the transformation of probabilities for the agent whose preferences are 
represented. This type of transformation function makes it possible to take into account 
a possible "certainty effect". Thus, a discontinuity of  (.) on the left at point 1 would 
very conveniently translate the psychological change that results from the passage from 
an area of perfect certainty to a zone of risk. 
 
This implies that near point 1,  ( )p p . The  ( )pi  are called by Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979), « decision weight ». They are no longer probabilities since  ( )pi
i
n


1
 is 
no longer necessarily equal to 1. Thus, the "paradoxes" of Allais are no longer 
necessarily paradoxes. 
2.2. Theory of anticipated utility 
Quiggin (1982) has taken up three axioms of VNM analysis: transitivity, first-order 
stochastic dominance, and continuity. To these three axioms, he added an axiom of 
independence weaker than that of the theory of expected utility. 
This axiom is as follows:  
Either a set of consequences C, and either a lottery  
niii
pxL
,.....,1
,

  such as the 
consequence ix  is associated with the probability ip  with nxxx  ......21 , then: 
niwherepxLetpxL iiii ,....,2,1),(),( 21   













2
1
,
2
1
);,( iii xxCEc , and if )()( 2
*
21
*
1 LCExandLCEx   then 
~),( ii pc












2
1
,
2
1
);,( *2
*
1 xx  where CE(X) is the certain equivalent of X. 
Thus Quiggin defines a functional utility V: L   such as: 
 
1/ )()( 21 LVLV   if and only if 21 LL  . 
2/ For a lottery L x p V L p u xi i i n i
i
n
i 

( , ) , ( ) ( ). ( ),........,1
1
   
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where   is a non-decreasing function of [0,1] into [0,1] verifying the following 
assumptions :  (.) is concave on the interval [0, 
2
1
] ( ( ip )  ip ) and convex on the 
interval [
2
1 ,1] ( ( ip )  ip ) with  (
2
1
) = 
2
1
 and  (1) = 1. 
3/ V is unique to an affine transformation by.                                                          [2] 
 
Quiggin shows that under these conditions, the first-order stochastic dominance is 
respected and that these hypotheses explain the paradoxes of Allais as well as the 
results of Friedman and Savage (1948) concerning the coexistence of the gamble and 
the insurance. They are also consistent with the experimental study by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), who observe that agents overweight low probabilities and underweight 
high probabilities. 
2.3. Dual theory 
Yaari (1987) proposed an alternative choice model to the expected utility model, which 
he described as dual theory. This theory evaluates the risky situation without 
transforming the final wealth into utility of wealth and modifying the probability 
distribution that defines the risk to which the individual is subjected. It is also noted that 
the attitude towards risk is no longer defined in the same way. Indeed, the criterion of 
expected utility expresses attitudes towards risk through the transformation of wealth. 
The dual theory and we will see later the RDEU theory define the attitudes towards the 
risk essentially through the transformation of the probabilities. The functional utility is 
defined as follows:       )(.)(
2
11 LDTpxxxLV
n
i
n
ij
jii 







  
 
                         [3]                                                 
However, in his paper, Yaari (1987) presented an implication of his model for simple 
portfolio choices and the result obtained is not very encouraging. Indeed, assuming that 
the investor has a choice between a safe asset and a risky asset whose return expectation 
exceeds the safe rate, Yaari obtains that the investor will never diversify, i.e. he will 
place all its fortune either in the safe asset or in the risky asset. 
As a result, it can be argued that this model has a propensity to provide corner solutions 
that run counter to the idea of diversification. Later, Gayant (2004) shows the 
importance of the transformation of probabilities in the combination of risky assets. 
2.4. Rank Dependent Expected Utility model (RDEU) 
The RDEU model is a late response to the criticisms of the EU model formulated by 
Allais by presenting the probabilities in a nonlinear manner and taking into account the 
observations of Ellsberg (1961), by weakening the axiom of independence. The first 
one to have generalized the utility expectation by highlighting the merits of the 
transformation of the probabilities depending on the rank of the results is Quiggin 
(1982). The objective of Quiggin was to introduce a preference functional taking into 
account the transformation of probabilities and not suffering from any of the 
shortcomings of the descriptive model of Kahnman and Tversky (1979). This anomaly, 
namely the violation of stochastic dominance, was eliminated by replacing the 
transformation of the probability of each event by transforming the distribution of the 
decumulated probabilities of ordered events by increasing result. As a result, agent 
preferences cannot be represented by a classical expected utility function, but rather by 
a rank dependent expected utility function. 
In accordance with the ranking dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory, the 
representative function of preferences is defined as follows: 
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For all X, Y random variables with values in a set of consequence or results        

M
M
X xGdxuXVwithYVXVYX ))(()()()()(                                     [4] 
where the function u(.) is continue, differentiable and strictly increasing from [-M, M] 
to  , unique modulo a strictly positive affine transformation, and  (.) is a function 
continue, strictly increasing from [0, 1] into [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we can 
assume that   (0) = 0 and   (1) = 1; furthermore   (.) is unique.  
Note that, when ),...;;.........,;,( 2211 nn pxpxpxLX  is a lottery 
with nxxx  .............21 ,    
    )(.)()()(.)()()().()( 1
2
12
1
1 nnn
n
i
i
n
i
i pxuxupxuxupxuLV  

                    
        )(.)()()(
2
11 


n
ij
j
n
i
ii pxuxuxu                                                                         [5] 
The weighting coefficients i  depend on the rank of the results ix , hence the name 
given to this theory. These weights reflect the marginal contribution of i  to the 
transformation function of the decumulated probabilities. In other words, the i , which 
are calculated by ordering the consequences from the most unfavorable to the most 
favorable, express a phenomenon of perception of probabilities or processing of risky 
information. As a result, the decision maker reasons his assessment of the theory by 
adding the following expectations: u( 1x ) (of which it is safe, so it weights by 1), the 
additional [u( 2x )-u( 1x )] which it weights by a transformation  (.) of the probability 
).........( 32 nppp   to have at least this extra in addition to u( 1x ) , ….., up to 
[ )]()([ 1 nn xuxu which it weights by the same transformation  (.) of its 
probability np .    
This representation of preferences is based on the assumption that there exists an 
objective probability distribution governing the appearance of states of nature in the 
second period. However, agents do not directly utilize this distribution to perform the 
expected utility calculations but first transform the objective probabilities. For 
stochastic dominance to be respected, it is necessary to consider the transform of the 
cumulative distribution. Consequently, the functional representing agent preferences is 
no longer linear with respect to the probabilities. In particular, the weights attached to 
each state of nature depend on the rank of these. 
Note that, under this representation, in the case of a lottery with two results, 
 V L u x p u x u x( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  1 2 2 1 . This is the particular specification of the prospect 
theory. 
The RDEU criterion is a generalization of expected utility. Indeed, it is seen that when 
the function   is the identity function (   ( ) , ,p p p   0 1 ), the representative 
function of preferences becomes the classical expected utility. Thus, the relation [5] 
becomes: 
   
 
 








n
i
ii
n
i
n
ij
jii LEUxuppxuxuxuLV
12
11 )()(.)()()()(                          [6] 
Moreover, when u(x) = x, the RDEU theory is none other than the dual theory of Yaari. 
So, the relation [6] is only a special case of the relation [5] 
As noted by J.P.Gayant (1995), the RDEU representation excludes any violation of 
first-order stochastic dominance. On the other hand, as its name indicates, this criterion 
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is characterized by the dependence on the rank of the results of the transformation of 
the probabilities. This means that the principle of invariance to the modification of a 
common consequence must not be postulated only when the replacement does not 
modify the order of the results. 
Tallon (1997) points out that one of the advantages of the rank-dependent theory of 
expected utility, is that it makes it possible to distinguish several notions of aversion to 
risk. Indeed, he notes that it is possible to define, independently of any representation of 
preferences, a notion of weak risk aversion (according to which a decision maker 
prefers the expectation of the lottery to the lottery itself) and a notion of strong risk 
aversion (according to which an agent prefers a given lottery to a constant mean spread 
of the same lottery)  
These two notions (Cohen, 1995) merge into the theory of expected utility and 
correspond to the concavity of the utility function in the certain. They are no longer 
equivalent in the context of rank-dependent utility. 
Contrary to the criterion of expected utility, rank dependent expected utility theories 
distinguish attitudes towards wealth and attitude towards risk, to explain decision-
making behavior. In this respect, they respond to experiments that stress that 
individuals underestimate or overestimate the probabilities of risk. i.e., they are 
optimistic or pessimistic (in relation to probabilities). To account for these behaviors, 
the RDEU theories have introduced in the calculation of the preference function a 
probability transformation function into the risk (Quiggin, 1982 and Yaari, 1987). 
These theories are able to predict cases often observed in reality or in experimental 
studies but unexplained by the EU theory. 
3. Risk aversion and new decision models 
The notion of risk aversion, which is a basic element in any economic application 
where the environment is not certain, has been questioned, especially with regard to the 
interpretation of certain results relating to the expected utility model. Thus, the 
emergence of new decision models necessitated a change in the characterization of risk 
aversion. Indeed, for a large number of economists, the notion of risk aversion is 
inseparable from the decline in marginal utility. If the two notions are confused in the 
expected utility model, they differ substantially in the general model of rank dependent 
expected utility. This observation is not without consequence. Indeed, the 
disappearance of the equivalence between the two notions in the RDEU model leads us 
to reconsider the notion of risk aversion in the EU model. 
3.1. Weak risk conversion 
According to the Arrow and Pratt view, the notion of risk aversion is implicitly a "weak 
risk" notion. 
Definition: weak risk aversion : An agent is weakly opposed to the risk if he prefers to 
any lottery the gain of his expected value with certainty. 
Under the assumptions of the expected utility model, there is equivalence between this 
notion of risk aversion and the concavity of the utility function. 
Chateuneuf & Cohen (1994) and Chateuneuf, Cohen & Meilijson (1997) show that a 
decision maker, satisfying the RDEU model and characterized by a utility function u(.) 
continuously differentiable and concave, is weakly opposed to the risk if and only if its 
function of transformation of the probabilities f(.) satisfied f(p)  p,  p  [0,1]. They 
demonstrate that if u(x) = 1- (1-x)n with n1, then it is weakly adverse to the risk if and 
only if its transformation function f(.) satisfied f(p) 1- (1-p)n, p  [0,1]. 
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3.2. Strong risk aversion 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) define a stronger notion. It is based on the concept of 
mean preserving spread: Given two random variables X and Y, whose probability 
distributions are YX LandL  , Y is deduced from X by a mean preserving spread if : 
1/ )L(E)L(E YX   
2/      dttYprobdttXprob,M;MT
T
M
T
M                                            [7] 
(The expression 2 / is the definition of second-order stochastic dominance (X dominates 
Y)). 
Definition: Strong risk aversion  
An agent is strongly opposed to the risk if between all pairs of random variables such 
that one is deduced from the other by a mean preserving spread, it always prefers the 
least "spread". 
Under the hypotheses of the expected utility model, there is also an equivalence 
between this notion of risk aversion and the concavity of the utility function and thus 
the equivalence between the notion of weak aversion and that of strong aversion. It is 
the questioning of the expected utility model, which will confer on the distinction 
aversion weak-strong all pertinence. Under the assumptions of the RDEU model, the 
two notions differ. In fact, before the emergence of this generalization, the distinction 
between these notions seemed unfounded. Thus, the generalization of expected utility 
leads not only to a careful consideration of the notion of risk aversion, but also to a re-
examination of the interpretations made over the past half century within the expected 
utility model. 
In addition, Quiggin (1992) defines a new notion of “mean monotone preserving 
spread” to define a new notion of risk aversion, intermediate between weak aversion 
and strong aversion. A comparison of these three concepts can be found in the utility 
model and in the RDEU model (Cohen, 1995). 
4. Reviews addressed to these models 
Several experimental studies (Bouyssou, 1984, Munier, 1989; Abdellaoui et al., 2007) 
have shown that individuals, confronted with simple risky choices, generally behave in 
contradiction with the hypothesis of linearity in probability and, consequently, in 
violation of the axiom of independence.  
On the other hand, Schoemaker (1991) has shown that the RDEU model provides a 
predictive improvement on the utility model only in the case of losses and does nothing 
to improve earnings. Gayant (1995) found that the Schoemaker study (1991) is not 
convincing, since the latter uses, in constructing these tests, implicit assumptions that 
go beyond the risk framework.  
Camerer (1992), Starmer (1992) and Abdellaoui & Munier (1994) lead series of 
experiments in the representation proposed by Machina (1982), known as the 
"Marshak-Machina Triangle". The triangle used by Marschak (1950) and Machina 
(1982) represents all possible lotteries with three fixed outcomes 321 xetx,x ordered: 
321 xxx  .  
The abscissa axis carries the probability p1 of the payment x1, and the axis of the 
ordinates carries the probability p3 of the payment x3. The sides of the triangle are 
chosen equal to the unit. Every point in the triangle gives p2 as the length of the 
horizontal segment that separates it from the hypotenuse. By describing the triangle, 
one describes visually all the possible distributions with fixed supports x1, x2 et x3. 
Munier (1989) has detailed this type of experimentation and the use of its graphic 
representation to explain the various "paradoxes". 
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If Starmer (1992) concludes that an alternative model to the utility model is necessary, 
it can not arbitrate between non-additive utility and regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 
1982).  
Camerer (1992) and Abdellaoui & Munier (1994) also attest to the inability of the 
classical model to represent the preferences of a majority of agents. They delimit in the 
triangle of Marshak-Machina, "zones" where the expected utility is valid and "zones" 
where it is not. Abdellaoui & Munier even determine an area where the RDEU model is 
invalidated. 
While there has not been much work on estimating the probability transformation 
function, the estimates of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) have been consistent with the 
intuition of Quiggin (1982) (the small probabilities are "over-weight" and the high 
probabilities are "under-weight").  
Another criticism, of an experimental nature, is addressed to these models. Indeed, 
experimental protocols are always defined from questions in order to know the degree 
of risk aversion of individuals. This information is necessary for at least two reasons: 
the first is to more precisely identify individual decisions and the second to verify 
theoretical predictions. 
However, the degree of risk aversion may not have the same value from one theory to 
another. Indeed, according to the expected utility model, attitudes to risk are calculated 
from a transformation of wealth, whereas in dual theory, they are determined as a 
function of the transformation of probabilities. 
In order for agents to reveal their preferences, researchers often propose: a fair or 
actuarial game or a risky situation. Subsequently, they check whether the agents pay a 
premium higher or lower than that which defines the risk neutrality according to the 
criterion of expected utility. If the price is higher, agents are averse towards risk, 
otherwise they like risk. 
In this context, we should note that monetary incentives in economics, in order to carry 
out such experiments, are commonly used to encourage the subject to reveal his 
preferences. Some economists who think that they may be the source of the 
inconsistencies of certain answers criticize these methods. In fact, Battalio et al. (1990) 
and Etchart & Haridon (2011) conclude that individuals have more risk aversion in the 
presence of monetary incentives.  
Moreover, the formulation of questions can influence individuals in their choice.     
Finally, the complexity of these models and especially the results of the tests they have 
been subjected to allow us to say that these models have not yet provided definitive 
answers allowing to conclude their superiority with respect to the expected utility 
model (Chateauneuf et al., 2005 & Trabelsi, 2006). 
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